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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of housing demand subsidies on rents using discontinuities in the 
Finnish housing allowance system as a quasi-experimental setting. The stepwise dependence 
of housing allowance on the floor area of the dwelling and the year of construction of the 
building causes economically and statistically significant discontinuities in the amount of 
housing allowances. However, our results show that there are no discontinuities in rents of the 
recipient households at these cut-offs. Instead, differences in the amount of the housing 
allowance are translated roughly one-to-one into differences in the rent net of housing 
allowance. 
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1 Introduction 
In most countries, governments subsidize the housing consumption of low-income households 
through various, often overlapping housing programs. Over the last few decades, the general 
trend has been towards less construction of social housing and increased reliance on direct 
subsidies for low-income households. Given this tendency, it is vital to understand the effects 
of these direct subsidies and to be aware of how the details of the programs affect their 
efficiency and distributional effects.      
A typical feature of housing allowance (henceforth HA) programs is that the subsidy depends 
on the characteristics of the household, such as income and household size. In addition, the 
subsidy is typically more generous in more expensive areas and also depends on other unit 
characteristics related to rent. The aim of these details is to level the out-of-pocket rents (rent 
net of housing allowance) and non-housing consumption of recipients. However, these 
differences likely affect the recipient households’ willingness to pay for rental housing, and 
could thereby affect the rents they pay. If the incidence of differences in HA generosity is to a 
large extent on the landlords, the redistributive goals of the scheme are not achieved. 
In this paper, we study whether and to what degree differences in HA generosity for different 
housing units affect rents. We consider the Finnish HA system where the HA is capped by a 
rent ceiling which depends in a stepwise manner on the floor area of the unit and the 
construction year of the building. We test for the existence of a similar stepwise pattern in 
rents using a regression discontinuity type approach and register data covering the universe of 
HA recipients in Finland. The discontinuities provide a quasi-experimental setting which 
makes it possible to isolate the impact of HA from other determinants of rent.   
Figure 1 illustrates our research design and presents the main results. The red vertical lines 
indicate the location of discontinuities in the rent ceiling. The dots correspond to the sample 
means by 0.5 m2 bins, and the black lines represent 2nd order polynomials fitted separately for 
each interval between the floor area cut-offs. Panel A shows that the discontinuities in the rent 
ceiling lead to clearly visible discontinuities in the amount of HA. In our econometric 
analysis, we demonstrate that, for example, on the right hand side of the first cut-off monthly 
HA is on average 15 euros lower than on the left hand side. This corresponds to 6.7% lower 
HA or 1.9% lower income. Panel B, in turn, shows that the relationship between floor area 
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and rent does not have similar stepwise pattern. This indicates that the differences in HA do 
not translate into differences in rents.  
In an instrumental variables regression, utilizing the discontinuities as instruments, we again 
find no effect of the HA on the rents of recipient households. The upper limit of the 95% 
confidence interval for our preferred estimate for the effect of a 1 euro higher housing 
allowance is about 0.2 euros. In our subsample analysis, we find some indication of rent 
effects when we focus on long term HA recipients or flats inhabited by HA recipients for 
several years. This suggests that the dynamics of recipient status and the rental market may 
matter for the incidence of HA.  
We contribute to the small literature on the incidence of housing demand subsidies by 
utilizing a plausibly exogenous source of variation in HA generosity. Our paper is closely 
related to the studies analyzing reforms which change the parameters of the scheme and 
therefore affect the distribution of benefits across households. Our finding that the incidence 
of differences in HA scheme is largely on the tenant is in line with the recent study by Brewer 
et al. (2016), but in contrast with most earlier studies. 
Brewer et al. (2016) study the incidence of housing benefits in the UK exploiting a package of 
housing benefit cuts in 2011–2012 as a natural experiment. Similar to our data, their data 
contain the universe of subsidy recipients, which implies relatively precise estimation and 
permits analyzing heterogeneous effects. Their results suggest that the incidence is 90% on 
the tenants, but they also report substantial variation between claimant groups. These findings 
differ substantially from Gibbons and Manning (2006) who use a similar reform in 1996–
1997 and find that the incidence is only 40% on the tenants.  
Fack (2006) and Laferrère and Le Blanc (2004) study French reforms which extended the 
housing subsidy program to households not previously eligible. Both studies find that the 
rents of housing benefit claimants increased faster than those of non-claimants after the 
reforms.  
Also in Finland, two previous studies have analyzed the incidence of HA exploiting variation 
in the rent ceilings used in calculating the HA. Kangasharju (2010) utilizes a reform in the 
rent ceilings in 2002 to analyze the impact of HA on rents. The main result is that one 
additional euro in HA led to a 60–70 cent increase in the rents paid by the claimants. In 
Appendix B, we repeat the analysis of the reform using the same data and the methods 
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described in Kangasharju (2010) but find different results. In particular, we do not find 
evidence of substantial effects on rents.  
Viren (2013) in turn regresses rents on maximum achievable HA. His results suggest that 30–
50% of the HA is shifted to rents. Our results imply a much smaller rent effect, but we argue 
that the internal validity of our research design is higher as we focus on the discontinuities in 
the rent ceilings at certain cut-offs that generate plausibly exogenous variation in the 
allowance, and perform extensive robustness and validity checks. We return to the 
relationship to the previous studies after having presented and discussed our results.  
The incidence of housing demand subsidies has also been analyzed in the context of the US 
voucher system.2 Collinson and Ganong (2016) exploit two different reforms of the system. 
The first reform increased the rent ceiling across-the-board and seems to have led to higher 
rents with little evidence of neighborhood quality improvements.3 The second reform, in turn, 
replaced the metropolitan area level rent ceilings with zip code level rent ceilings. As a result, 
rents increased in expensive neighborhoods and decreased in low-cost neighborhoods. The 
reform also led to improved neighborhood quality with little change in overall rents paid by 
voucher households. 
Our analysis is not directly informative about the effects of the size of the HA system on 
overall rent level. These effects are studied by Eriksen and Ross (2015) who analyze the 
impact of changes in the US housing choice voucher program by exploiting two reforms 
which increased the supply of vouchers to a varying degree in different metropolitan areas. 
Their results indicate that increased supply of vouchers did not affect the overall rental rate 
but shifted demand from lower quality units towards higher quality units. This finding is in 
contrast with earlier results by Susin (2002) who finds that that rents paid by non-recipient 
low-income households increased faster in metropolitan areas with more vouchers. For the 
UK, Gibbons and Manning (2006) use the differences in the share of housing subsidy 
recipients in different regions in order to assess the general equilibrium effects, but do not 
find evidence of strong effects on the overall rent level. 
2 The US housing choice voucher system is very different form the Finnish HA system. A household is eligible 
for a voucher if its income is low enough relative to the local income level. Not all eligible households receive a 
voucher. If it does, it needs to find an apartment which satisfies the requirements of the program. The size of the 
subsidy is determined by local rent ceilings which the housing authorities set based on the local fair market rent 
determined by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
3 For most recipients, the rent was below the rent ceiling before the reform. This means that their out-of-pocket 
rent is a fixed share of their income and not affected by rent increases.  
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2 The institutional setting 
2.1 The housing allowance system 
The Finnish housing allowance program consists of three parts: general HA, HA for 
pensioners and housing supplement for students. The program is financed by the government 
through the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela). We focus on the general HA, 
which is intended for working age low-income households and is the most important tenant-
based housing subsidy system in terms of the number of recipients and total outlays.  
Our data cover the years 2008 to 2013.4 In 2013, general HA expenditures were roughly 670 
million euros (Kela, 2014) which amounts to 0.34% of GDP. In December 2013, roughly 
eight percent of population under the age of 65 years received the general HA. The average 
monthly allowance was about 280 euros. 
Eligibility for the HA is based on pre-tax income, financial wealth and household size but 
does not depend on whether the tenant lives in private rental housing or social housing. The 
allowance is determined by the following formula:5  
(1) 
ܪܣ = 0.8 ∗ [Min(ݎ݁݊ݐ/݉ଶ, ݎ݁݊ݐ_݈ܿ݁݅݅݊݃) ∗Min(ܽݎ݁ܽ, ܽݎ݁ܽ_݈ܿ݁݅݅݊݃) − ݀݁݀ݑܿݐܾ݈݅݁] 
The formula contains three different elements. First, the allowance covers rents up to a 
maximum rent per square meter (rent ceiling).  If the rent per square meter exceeds the rent 
ceiling, the excess rent is neglected when calculating the HA. The rent ceiling depends on the 
floor area of the unit, the construction (or major renovation) year and location of the building. 
Table 1 below shows an example. 
Second, the allowance covers rents up to a maximum floor area of the unit (floor area ceiling). 
Again, the excess floor area is neglected when calculating the HA. The area ceiling depends 
on the household size only. For example, the ceiling is 37m2 for a single and 57m2 for a 
couple. 
4 The general HA (yleinen asumistuki) was reformed in the beginning of 2015. As our data cover the time period 
between 2008 and 2013, in what follows we will describe the system as it existed before this recent reform. 
5 Lyytikäinen (2008) provides a more detailed description of the system. 
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Third, the allowance is means-tested and involves a deductible if household income exceeds 
an income limit which depends on the household size and location of the building. The 
deductible increases with pre-tax income and is lower for larger households. The allowance 
covers 80% of the difference between the actual rent (or the rent up to the ceilings) and the 
deductible.  
Similar households will receive different HA depending on the region where they live. 
Finnish municipalities are divided into four regions according to housing affordability. The 
rent ceilings and income limits vary from one region to another. Region 1 is the capital city 
Helsinki. Region 2 consists of the rest of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA). Region 3 
includes 30 medium sized towns, and region 4 is the rest of Finland.6  
The tenant applies for the HA from Kela and typically the HA is paid to the tenant. When 
applying for the HA, the household can also authorize Kela to pay the subsidy directly to the 
landlord. In our estimation sample, about 26% of the recipients choose this alternative. In 
these cases, the landlord knows not only the recipient status of the tenant but also the amount 
of subsidy received.  
Our estimation strategy exploits the feature that the rent ceiling is a step function of the unit 
size and the construction year of the building. As an example, Table 1 shows the rent ceilings 
in medium-sized towns (region 3) in 2012. The floor area and construction year cut-offs 
shown in the table are the same for all affordability regions. The rent ceilings and as a result 
also the size of the jumps at the cut-offs vary slightly from one affordability region to another. 
As the table shows, the discontinuities in the schedule are quite large. For instance, for a 
housing unit of 35 square meters, the rent ceiling is 9.72 euros per square meter if the building 
is constructed in 1985, but is 13% higher (11 euros) if the building is constructed in 1986. 
That is, the maximum monthly rent taken into account when determining the HA is 340.5 
euros in a building constructed in 1985 and 385.0 euros in a building constructed in 1986. In 
the same manner, the rent ceiling is 10.56 euros per square meter for a housing unit of size 
30.5 square meters built in 1985, but is 8% lower if the floor area is 31 square meters. 
Translated into rent levels, this means that for a 30.5 square meter dwelling the maximum 
6 The discontinuities in the rent ceilings at the region borders are not suitable for studying the effects of the HA 
on rents as the borders are determined based on municipality borders and many other things affecting the rents 
also change these borders. 
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monthly rent taken into account when determining the HA is 322.1 euros while for a 31m2 
dwelling, it is 301.3 euros.  
For larger units, the maximum monthly rent taken into account when determining the HA 
depends not only on the rent ceiling but also on the size of the household through the floor 
area ceiling. For instance, if a single household was renting a 45 square meters dwelling built 
in 1985, it faces a rent ceiling of 9.27 euros but the area exceeding 37 square meters is 
excluded when calculating the HA.   
2.2 Social housing and social assistance 
The second major housing-related subsidy program in Finland is social rental housing 
intended mostly for low-income households. In 2008, roughly half of all rental housing was 
social housing, but the share of the social rental housing has been decreasing slightly over the 
last ten years.  
The social housing units are mainly owned by municipalities but also by various non-profit 
organizations. The owners receive subsidies from the municipality and the central government 
and commit to different types of regulation. For instance, the rents cannot be freely set but 
must be based on the capital and maintenance costs of the building. Also, because in many 
social rental housing units tenant selection is based on household income and housing needs, 
the households in the social housing rental units tend to have on average lower incomes than 
those is private rental market. 
The HA is determined in the same manner in both rental market sectors. However, because of 
the restrictions in rent setting in the social housing sector, one would not expect the HA to 
affect rents of the social housing tenants.  
Finally, HA recipients in both private and social rental sector are entitled to social assistance 
if their income and assets do not cover their necessary daily expenses, including housing. For 
these households, social assistance can cover up to 100% of the housing costs. As a result, the 
incentives generated by the HA system may be not relevant for these households.  
There exist no comprehensive data on housing costs covered by social assistance for the time 
period of our study. But as eligibility for social assistance is based on income, we can address 
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this issue by splitting the sample by income and studying separately those with high enough 
income not to be eligible for social assistance.  
3 Potential mechanisms behind rent effects 
Housing subsidy programs may influence households and the housing markets in various 
ways. The programs directly affect recipient households’ housing costs and disposable 
income. In addition, the programs affect all households through the taxes required to finance 
the programs. They may also influence the allocation of households into rental housing units 
and the rents paid by recipient and non-recipient households. At least in principle, programs 
may also affect the size and distribution of the overall stock of rental housing. This means that 
the short run effects of the programs may differ from those observed in a longer run. All these 
effects are likely to depend on the share of recipient households in the rental market, on the 
elasticity of rental housing demand and supply, on the competitiveness of the rental market, as 
well as the details of the program. Therefore, the results of different empirical studies are not 
necessarily directly comparable. 
This paper focuses on the rents paid by the recipient households. There are several potential 
reasons for why the amount of HA received by the tenant might affect the rent of the 
dwelling. First, if the rental housing market is characterized by substantial frictions and the 
rents are negotiated between the tenant and the landlord, the rent of any given unit may 
depend on the characteristics of the tenant, including the amount of housing allowance 
received. Second, the tenant and the landlord may jointly agree on a higher rent so as to 
maximize the HA received.7 Third, if landlords perceive HA recipients to be more costly than 
other tenants due to, say, a higher risk of damage to the unit, HA recipients may face a rent 
premium.8 The first two mechanisms are potentially relevant in our context. 
Several papers (e.g. Laferrère and Le Blanc, 2004; Gibbons and Manning, 2006; Fack, 2006; 
Kangasharju, 2011; Viren, 2013;9 Collinson and Ganong, 2016, and Brewer et al., 2016) have 
7 The incentives for this type of collusion obviously depend on the design of the system. In the Finnish system, 
the HA covers up to 80% of the rent. Therefore, the incentive to collude is not as high powered as, for instance, 
in the US voucher system where, below the rent ceiling, any increase in rent is entirely paid by the housing 
authority.  
8 On the other hand, if the tenant has authorized KELA to pay HA directly to the landlord, the landlord may also 
view the recipient households as less risky because of guaranteed stream of rental payments,. 
9 Viren’s (2013) period of analysis includes a HA reform but his empirical analysis is not focused on the 
variation generated by the reform. Viren (2013) finds that higher HA is related to higher rent using register data 
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studied the effect of HA on the rents of recipient households by exploiting reforms which 
affected the subsidy received by different households in different ways. Brewer et al. (2016) 
find that on average the incidence is largely on the tenant. Most other studies tend to conclude 
that the subsidy is to a large extent passed on to the landlords in the form of higher rents 
although they are typically not able to discriminate between the three mechanisms discussed 
above.  
Instead of relying on a reform in generating identifying variation, our empirical strategy 
exploits the stepwise dependence of the HA on the floor area of the unit and the construction 
year of the building (see Figure 1). Because of these discontinuities in the amount of HA, 
recipient households’ willingness to pay for two similar units could change at the cut-off. As a 
result, rents paid by recipient households could be higher on the generous side of the cut-offs. 
The discontinuities also create incentives to choose dwellings on the generous side of the cut-
offs. If the recipients respond to these incentives, we would expect HA recipients to be over-
represented just below the floor area cut-offs and above the construction year cut-offs. 
The strength of these demand responses may depend on the institutional details.  For instance, 
optimizing housing choices precisely might be difficult if the rental market is thin with 
respect to the relevant unit characteristics (floor area and construction year). Also, the 
difference in the willingness to pay between two alternative, otherwise similar dwellings but 
with different levels of HA should depend on expected benefit duration. Finally, at least in the 
Finnish system, the incentives may also be muted because of the social assistance system 
covering housing costs for HA recipients with very low incomes. Our data will allow us to 
partly address these concerns. We can study whether the results are sensitive to differences in 
benefit duration and analyze separately a subsample of recipient households with income 
levels high enough not to be eligible for social assistance.  
Two additional margins of adjustment are potentially important especially over the long run if 
the share of HA recipients is large. First, if the HA system directs housing demand towards 
certain types of units, rental housing supply can be expected to respond to the demand. This 
type of supply response should reinforce discontinuities in the floor area and construction 
year distributions. We do not have data on the characteristics of the overall rental stock, but 
on HA recipients. Using another data set, which includes also non-recipients, he finds no difference in rents paid 
by recipients and non-recipients. Based on these two findings, he argues that the law-of-one-price holds and HA 
affects the overall rent level. 
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we can analyze the distribution of recipient households in the proximity of the cut-offs. As we 
do not observe discontinuities in this distribution, we conjecture that the effects on the overall 
rental stock are likely to be modest at most.  
Second, the landlords’ incentive to maintain and renovate units changes at the cut-offs as 
recipient households’ willingness to pay for the units changes. As a result, it is possible that 
discontinuities in the HA translate into discontinuities in quality-adjusted rents even if the 
observed rent level develops smoothly when crossing the cut-offs. This is an issue to be kept 
in mind when interpreting the results as we do not have data on the quality of units.  
Like most previous studies, our strategy is based on the comparison of rents paid by different 
groups of tenants. If there are no frictions in the rental market, a subsidy program that affects 
a subset of households will affect the rents paid by all households.10 If so, an empirical 
strategy based on the comparison of the rent changes in different subgroups fails to detect the 
effect of the subsidy program on the overall rent development. Two different approaches exist 
in the literature to address this issue. One study (Gibbons and Manning, 2006) uses variation 
in the share of housing subsidy recipients in the UK in the different housing market areas but 
does not find evidence of strong general equilibrium effects. Two studies exploit geographic 
variation in the size of the US housing voucher system (Susin, 2002, and Eriksen and Ross, 
2015). While Susin finds that non-recipient low-income households pay higher rents in areas 
with more vouchers, Eriksen and Ross conclude that increased supply of vouchers did not 
affect the overall rental rate.  
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Data 
We use data on all HA recipients and their dwellings provided by Kela for the years 2008–
2013. The data are originally monthly payment data. We keep only regular payments11 and 
collapse the data by address, recipient, monthly rent, monthly HA and year. We define cases 
where any of these five variables changes as new observations. 12 It can be argued that this 
10 Of course, the fact that rent contracts feature a certain degree of rigidity could lead to delayed responses. 
11 We drop claw-backs and retrospective payments. 
12 The average number of observations per dwelling per year is 1.49. 
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leads to overweighing of dwellings with frequent changes in rent or high turnover, and 
dwellings occupied by recipients whose circumstances change so that the amount of HA is 
reviewed. We test for the robustness of our findings to keeping only one randomly drawn 
observation for each dwelling each year.  
We limit the analysis to dwellings with a floor area below 41 square meters because the 
discontinuities in HA are stronger for small flats than for larger flats. In addition, for small 
flats, the floor area ceilings are not binding and the whole floor area of the flat is typically 
taken into account when determining the HA. For larger flats, the floor area ceiling often 
becomes binding. In addition, because the floor area ceilings depend on the household size, 
they cause noise for bigger flats.  
As discussed in Section 2, rents in the social housing sector are set administratively and the 
rent ceilings are typically not binding. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the private rental 
market only, but report the results concerning the social housing sector in Appendix A.  
Figure 2 shows that there are clear discontinuities in the rent ceiling at all floor area cut-offs 
in our main estimation sample. For instance, on average the rent ceiling used to calculate the 
HA for flats with a floor area of 26m2 is slightly less than 12 euros and roughly 12.8 euros for 
flats with a floor area of 25.5m2. As the figure shows, there is also some variation in the rent 
ceiling away from the cut-offs. This is because the rent ceiling varies from one affordability 
region to another and also depends on the construction year of the building. The rent ceilings 
are also typically adjusted upwards each year. 
The rent ceilings and income limits used in calculating the HA vary from one affordability 
region to another. Nevertheless, the rent ceiling is binding relatively infrequently in 
affordability region 4, which consists of small municipalities. In addition, rental market 
conditions may be quite different in rural areas than in large cities and towns.  Therefore, we 
leave out affordability region 4 from the analysis.13  
In regions 1–3, the rent ceilings are binding for over 80% of small flats. This is important for 
the analysis. If the actual rents per square meter were substantially lower than the rent ceilings 
used to calculate the HA, changes in the rent ceilings should not be expected to influence 
13 A series of municipal mergers took place in Finland during the time period of the study. Most importantly, in 
the beginning of 2009, some 70 small municipalities merged with larger ones and, as a result, are likely to have 
been reclassified from affordability region 4 to region 3.  
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rents. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the proportionate differences between actual rents 
and the rent ceiling in our main estimation sample. 
Figure 1 in the introduction showed that the discontinuities in rent ceiling cause clear 
discontinuities in actual HA. The discontinuities in the rent ceiling shown in Figure 2 are 
somewhat stronger.  There are three main reasons for this. First, as Figure 3 shows, the rent 
ceiling is not always binding and hence the HA does not change at the cut-off. Second, the 
HA also depends on the income of the household through the deductible. In addition, even 
when the deductible is zero, the HA only covers 80% of the rent up to the rent ceiling. 
Nevertheless, individual jumps are clearly visible and economically significant for low-
income households. 
Our data cannot be used to assess the importance of HA for the entire private rental market 
because they only include information on HA recipients. Based on additional calculations 
using the Income Distribution Survey data (IDS)14 for the same time period, the share of HA 
recipients was slightly below 20% in the kind of flats included in our main estimation sample. 
The share varies by affordability region and the type of dwelling. 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the main variables for our main estimation sample. With 
the above restrictions, there are some 273,000 observations in the data (83,620 recipients and 
73,819 flats). The mean rent is roughly 434 euros/month and the mean floor area 32 square 
meters. On average, the HA is some 226 euros/month which implies that the average net rent 
(or out-of-pocket rent) is roughly 208 euros/month.  
14 The IDS data are a representative sample of Finnish households with an annual sample size of about 10,000 
households. 
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As discussed in Section 3, the expected benefits of adjusting housing choices according to the 
HA scheme depend on how persistent the recipient status is expected to be. Table 3 reports 
observed lengths of HA spells starting in 2009.15 Approximately 28% do not continue as HA 
recipients in 2010 and for another 29% the spell discontinues before 2011. Thus for the 
majority of HA recipients, the subsidy appears to serve as temporary assistance. On the other 
hand, some 23% continue as recipients for five or more years. 
4.2 Empirical strategy 
Estimating the effect of housing allowance on rents is challenging because typically, other 
things equal, the housing allowance is bigger if the rent is higher. This reverse causality 
implies that simple OLS regression gives biased results. In addition, housing allowance is 
likely to be correlated with other factors that affect rent.  
However, the fact that the rent ceiling jumps at certain cut-off points can be used to identify 
the impact of the HA on rent. The idea is to compare rents below and above the cut-off points 
where the HA changes sharply. These discontinuities generate variation in the generosity of 
the housing allowance. The variation is plausibly exogenous because there is no reason, other 
than the HA, to expect the relationship between rents and floor space (or construction year) to 
be stepwise, when we control for smooth but flexible functions of these attributes.  
Our empirical strategy has the features of a regression discontinuity design (RDD) discussed 
in e.g. Lee and Lemieux (2010). However, the setting differs from an ideal RDD in that HA 
recipients can sort into flats with different attributes. The discontinuities may also affect 
selection into the sample.16 Sorting of HA recipients to flats with more generous HA is one of 
the channels through which rents could be affected because such sorting would increase the 
demand for flats where the HA is higher. The standard RDD tests (balancing tests and 
McCrary test) are useful in studying potential sorting. 
The main focus of our empirical analysis is on the floor area discontinuities, because visual 
examination of the data shows that the relationship between rent and floor area is smoother 
15 The sample used to produce Table 3 includes recipients who were in our estimation sample in 2009 but did not 
receive HA in 2008. The length of spell is calculated so that it is not affected by attrition from the estimation 
sample (e.g. through moving to another area or to a larger dwelling). 
16 A household with a relatively large deductible may be eligible on the generous side of the cut-off but not on 
the other side. Similarly, the discontinuity in the size of the HA may affect take-up. 
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than the relationship between rent and construction year. Thus, the floor area cut-offs likely 
provide a cleaner source of variation and give more precise estimates. The same methodology 
can be used for the construction year discontinuities. We present the results for the 
construction year discontinuities in Appendix A and discuss the findings briefly after 
analyzing the floor area cut-offs. 
Our sample consists of units with floor area varying from 21m2 to 40.9m2. The sample 
therefore includes the first three floor area cut-offs shown in Table 1 (26m2, 31m2 and 36m2).  
98% of the observations of floor area are concentrated on multiples of 0.5m2 (76% integers). 
We round the observations not divisible by 0.5m2 down to the closest 0.5m2. Thus we have 40 
floor area clusters. Heaping of the observations to integer values may bias our estimation 
results if the likelihood of an integer floor area is correlated with some determinants of rent 
(Barreca et al. 2016). We address this concern by controlling for integer values and testing for 
the robustness of our results for dropping non-integers. 
Our empirical analysis has three steps. First, in order to visualize the discontinuities at the 
floor area cut-offs, we calculate bin averages for rent ceiling, HA, rent, and net rent in our 
sample for the discrete values of floor areas and plot these averages at the floor area values. 
The graphical analysis is presented in Figures 1–3. In each figure, the dots show bin averages 
of these variables and the vertical red lines show the location of the cut-offs where the rent 
ceiling changes. The figures include the fits of second order polynomials estimated separately 
for each group separated by the cut-offs.17  
Second, we estimate the effect of each cut-off on the HA and the rent separately18 using the 
model 
(2)           ௜ܻ = α + ∑ ߚ௝ܦ௝(ܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜ > ܿݑݐ݋݂ ௝݂)୨ + ݂(ܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜) + ߜ′ ௜ܺ + ݑ௜.    
The dependent variable Yi is HA per square meter or rent per square meter in unit i. The 
explanatory variables of interest are the dummy variables D for values above the various floor 
area cut-offs. Using floor area group dummies defined in an overlapping way implies that the 
β coefficients can be interpreted as the impact of crossing the cut-off on Yi. We control for the 
direct impact of floor area by including a smooth function f of floor area in the model. The 
17 The regression is weighted by the number of observations in the bin. 
18 Alternatively, we could pool the discontinuities and normalize the floor area to zero at each discontinuity to 
estimate a pooled RD treatment effect. Our strategy is preferable because it fully exploits the information 
available in our multi-cut-off setup (See Cattaneo et al., 2016).  
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function is allowed to vary between the cut-offs. In order to allow for a straightforward 
interpretation of the β coefficients, the function f is in practice modeled through an 
overlapping sequence of floor area variables normalized to zero at the cut-offs. These 
normalized floor area variables are interacted with the respective floor area group dummies:   
(3)           ݂(ܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜) = ݃଴(ܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜) + ∑ [ܦ௝(ܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜ > ܿݑݐ݋݂ ௝݂)୨ ∗
݃௝(ܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜ − ܿݑݐ݋݂ ௝݂)]. 
Other control variables in Xi include municipality-specific year fixed effects, postcode fixed 
effects and affordability group-specific dummies for construction year dummies, type of land 
lord (an individual or a firm) and integer value of floor area. We include these control 
variables in all specifications to gain precision. In addition, some specifications include 
characteristics of recipient households (income, household size and age of household head). 
Finally, we quantify the impact of HA on rent through instrumental variables regression 
where we use the discontinuities as exogenous instruments for HA. The first stage of the IV 
regression is model (2) with HA as the dependent variable. The floor area group dummies are 
the excluded instruments. In the second stage, we estimate the model:   
(4)           ܴ௜ = ߚଵ + ߚଶܪܣ෢ ௜ + ݂(ܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜) + ߛ ௜ܺ + ݑ௜, 
where Ri is the rent per square meter and the regressors are the predicted HA from the first 
stage together with polynomials of floor area and other controls. 
This kind of IV regression arguably solves the reverse causality and omitted variables issues 
and gives an estimate of the impact of HA on rent isolated from other determinants of rent.  
The identifying assumption is that the floor area cut-off dummies are orthogonal to the error 
term. This should be the case if other determinants of HA develop smoothly with respect to 
floor area and are therefore captured by the f function. The main worry here is that sorting and 
sample selection might lead to discontinuities in the background characteristics. This can be 
examined through balance of covariates tests where we use characteristics of the dwellings 
and HA recipients as dependent variables in model (2).  
As discussed above, our assignment variable is discrete. This means that we cannot compare 
the means of the dependent variable just below and above the cut-offs. The conditions for 
non-parametric or semi-parametric methods are not satisfied (Lee and Card, 2008). Thus we 
are forced to perform simple parametric RDD analysis, where we choose a functional form for 
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the relationship between the assignment variable and the outcome variable. We use 1st and 2nd 
order polynomials which are allowed to vary between the cut-offs in our main tables. The use 
of higher order polynomials would likely lead to overfitting, but we report specifications with 
all (in total 81) combinations of 1st–3rd order polynomials for the four intervals separated by 
the cut-offs as a robustness check. 
The discreteness of the assignment variable also has implications for statistical inference. As 
pointed out by Lee and Card (2008), specification errors in the fitted regression line imply 
that at each discrete value there is an error component positively correlated within 
observations at that particular point. As a result, conventional standard errors are downward-
biased. Therefore, we cluster standard errors at discrete values of floor area. 
4.3 Results 
Our graphical analysis (Figures 1 and 2) shows that there are clear discontinuities in the rent 
ceilings and actual HA received at the floor area cut-offs. It also suggests that these 
differences in the generosity of the HA system do not translate into differences in relative 
rents.  
We now turn to regression analysis where we estimate the size of the discontinuities in HA 
and rents at the cut-offs, and estimate the impact of HA on rents utilizing the three 
discontinuities as instruments for HA.  
Table 4 shows the estimation results for model (2). The coefficients are changes in HA, in 
rent or in net rent in euros (per square meter per month) when crossing the floor area cut-offs. 
Columns 1–4 report the effect of crossing the cut-offs on monthly HA per square meter and 
columns 5–8 show the effect on monthly rent per square meter. For both outcomes, we 
consider four different specifications. To gain precision, all the specifications include 
construction year dummies interacted with affordability group, a dummy for integer values of 
floor area interacted with affordability group, municipality-year fixed effects (34 
municipalities and 6 years) and postcode fixed effects (799 postcodes). The first specification 
is a naïve regression where we do not control for floor area of the unit. In the second and the 
third specifications, we add 1st and 2nd order polynomials of floor area. The last specification 
includes household characteristics as additional controls. For the third outcome, the monthly 
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net rent per square meter in column 9, we report only the third specification without the 
household characteristics.  
The first four columns show that there are clear and statistically significant jumps in HA per 
square meter at all three cut-offs. Comparisons of the jumps in HA with the mean income and 
HA reported in Table 2 indicates that the jumps are not large but not negligible either. For 
example, crossing the first cut-off implies on average a 15 euro reduction in the monthly HA 
(26m2 * 0.576 euros/m2) which corresponds to a 6.7% decrease in HA or 1.9% decrease in 
income.  
Turning to the monthly rent per square meter in columns 5–8, all the coefficients are negative 
and significant in the naïve regression of column 5 where we do not control for floor area. In 
column 6, where this effect is controlled for using the 1st order polynomials, there is one 
significant coefficient with a counterintuitive sign. With the 2nd order polynomials in column 
7, all the coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant and have reasonably 
narrow confidence intervals. Adding household characteristics in column 8 has little effect on 
the results.  
Column 9 shows that crossing the floor area cut-offs has a statistically significant effect on 
the net rent (the difference between the actual rent and the HA) of the recipient households. 
At all the cut-offs, households just to the right of the cut-off have higher housing expenses 
after the housing allowance has been taken into account than those just to the left of the cut-
off.   
Table 5 shows the result of the IV regression of model (4). The specifications used are the 
same as in Table 4. The first stage F-statistics are high indicating that the instruments are 
strong enough for reliable estimation. The first stage regressions are reported in Table 4. 
Table A5 in Appendix A shows the results with all possible combinations of 1st–3rd order 
polynomials of floor area for the intervals between the cut-offs. 
In the first column of Table 5 without the 1st or 2nd order polynomial of the floor area, the 
housing allowance coefficient is positive and significant. Adding the 1st and 2nd order 
polynomials first turns the estimate negative and significant and then brings it close to zero.  
In column 5, the dependent variable is the net rent per square meter. The results indicate that a 
higher HA translates roughly one-to-one into a lower net rent.  
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Results for sub-groups 
As discussed in Section 3, there are reasons to expect that the effects of HA on rents are 
heterogeneous and depend on the circumstances of the household. In Table 6, we repeat the 
analysis discussed above for various sub-samples based on recipient and unit characteristics. 
The first panel shows the IV estimates for the effects of HA on rents (corresponding to 
column 3 in Table 5) and the second panel the reduced form of IV regressions (corresponding 
to column 7 in Table 4). 
In the first column, we limit the sample to those 26% of the HA recipients whose HA is paid 
directly to the landlord. In the second and the third columns, we divide the sample into two 
groups based on income: those with incomes lower and higher than the mean income. This is 
because the details of the HA system might be less important for those with very low incomes 
as they are eligible for social assistance covering their housing costs. In the fourth and fifth 
columns, we focus on those flats and recipient households that appear regularly (in at least 
five out of six years) in our data. The rationale is that one might not expect HA to influence 
willingness to pay for different types of units or housing consumption choices if the 
household’s reliance on the HA is very short term. While we cannot know what the 
expectations of the recipient households are when they make their housing consumption 
choices, we can examine whether the effects are different for those who end up receiving HA 
for extended durations. Finally, in columns 6 and 7 we consider the effects separately for 
those with a private individual and a corporation as their landlord. The effects could be 
different as institutional landlords are more likely to use posted rents as opposed to bargaining 
while private landlords might be more willing to negotiate with potential tenants.    
Starting from the reduced form of IV estimates in the lower panel, there is some evidence of 
rent effects for long-term HA recipients and flats inhabited by HA recipients for longer 
periods. In these groups, there is a statistically significant (at the 5% level) downward shift in 
rent at the first cut-off, and also at the third cut-off for the long term HA flat group. In the 
other groups, none of the coefficients for crossing the floor area cut-offs are significant, apart 
from one with a counterintuitive sign in column 7. Despite some significant coefficients in the 
reduced form regressions, all the IV estimates in the upper panel are insignificant. The results 
are not entirely conclusive for some sub-groups because the standard errors are rather large. 
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All the results above concern tenants in the private rental market. Table A4 in Appendix A 
reports estimates for municipality owned housing and for privately-owned subsidized 
housing. The reduced form of IV estimates might suggest some impact on rents in the 
privately-owned subsidized housing at one of the cut-offs, but the IV estimates are 
insignificant for both sectors. In both cases, the first stage F values are low which is not 
surprising as the rent ceiling is much less frequently binding in the social housing sector than 
in the private rental market. Also the share of very small flats is smaller than the private rental 
market. Accordingly, the standard errors are large especially at the first floor area cut-off.  
Construction year cut-offs 
The analysis above utilizes variation due to discontinuities in HA at floor area cut-offs. The 
effects might differ for other types of variation in HA. For example, the dependence of HA on 
other characteristics might trigger rent responses if the demand for these characteristics is 
more price elastic than the demand for housing space. Collison and Ganong (2016), for 
instance, study a reform which made the US housing voucher system more generous in 
expensive neighborhoods and less generous in low-cost neighborhoods, and find evidence of 
demand and price responses. Brewer et al. (2016) argue that variation in the incidence is 
explained by differences in demand elasticities across recipient groups. 
The stepwise dependence of HA on construction year of the dwelling offers an additional 
source of variation in HA19. We repeat the analysis presented and discussed above using the 
cut-offs for the year of construction or major renovation (henceforth construction year) in 
Appendix A. There are two construction year cut-offs in the scheme, in 1986 and 1996. For 
the analysis, we restrict the sample to a +/- 10 year band around these cut-offs (flats built 
between 1975 and 2006) which reduces the sample size from roughly 273,000 to 132,086.  
Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix A show that the discontinuity in HA is particularly strong at 
the 1986 cut-off. In Figure A3, there is some indication of an upward shift in rents at the first 
cut-off, but no sign of a jump in rents at the second cut-off. The figure also reveals that there 
is substantial variation in rents and the relationship between rents and construction year does 
not appear to be very smooth. Thus the analysis utilizing the floor area discontinuities is likely 
to be more reliable. Table A1 shows estimates of the discontinuities in HA and rent and Table 
19 Variation in HA generosity across the borders of the four affordability regions is probably not exogenous in 
Finland because the borders coincide with municipality borders where other determinants of rents, such as local 
taxes and public services, change at the same time. Moreover, RDD type analysis might not be feasible because 
the rental market is often thin in border areas which are typically outside urban areas. 
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A2 reports the IV estimates. According to columns 7 and 8 in Table A1, there is a jump in the 
rent at the second cut-off but not at the first cut-off where the discontinuity in HA is larger. 
The IV estimates are close to zero and insignificant. Overall, the results are in line with the 
findings of the analysis based on the floor area cut-offs. 
Relationship with previous Finnish studies 
The finding that differences in the level of HA do not affect rents is in contrast with two 
previous Finnish studies (Viren, 2013, and Kangasharju, 2010). Viren (2013) uses similar (but 
smaller) register data on HA recipients as we do for an earlier time period. The analysis 
exploits the whole range of variation embedded in the rent ceiling differences.20 He estimates 
reduced form models of rent on maximum achievable HA and various controls. As regards 
floor area and construction year, his controls include only the first order terms fitted over the 
whole support of the distribution of floor area and construction year. In the light of our 
analysis, this is clearly insufficient to capture the underlying relationship between these 
attributes and rents. We, on the other hand, focus on data close to cut-offs where rent ceilings 
have an important impact on actual HA and generate plausibly exogenous variation in the 
allowance. We also control for the running variables in a more flexible way and perform 
extensive robustness and validity checks. Therefore, we argue that the internal validity of the 
analysis is higher here than in Viren (2013).  
Kangasharju (2010) in turn studies a reform which increased the rent ceilings in 2002 using 
the Income Distribution Statistics data which combines register data and survey elements. The 
IDS is a representative sample of Finish households and contains both HA recipient and non-
recipient households. The study presents differences-in-differences results based on the 
comparison of rental rates of recipient and non-recipient households before and after the 
reform as well as an instrumental variable estimation exploiting the variation in the changes in 
the rent ceiling. The main result is that one additional euro in HA led to a 60–70 cent increase 
in the rents paid by the recipient household. In Appendix B, we repeat the analysis of the 
2002 reform using the same data and the methods described in Kangasharju (2010) but find 
different results. In particular, we do not find evidence of large rent effects. All in all, the 
comparison of our analysis to the previous Finnish studies highlights the importance of a 
credible research design and transparent empirical analysis. 
20 The discussion presenting the empirical strategy in Viren (2013) is not very detailed and hence it is not 
entirely clear what the sources of identifying variation are. 
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4.4 Robustness and validity 
In this section, we report the results of the robustness checks. We also discuss the internal 
validity (in particular, the possible manipulation of the assignment variable close to the cut-
offs and the balance of the covariates by treatment status) and the external validity of the 
results.  
Internal validity 
The existence of the floor area cut-offs at which the rent ceiling changes may, at least in 
principle, induce behavioral responses both on the demand and supply side. When thinking 
about supply, two issues should be discussed. First, the ability of landlords or tenants to 
manipulate floor area (reported to Kela) could invalidate our RD analysis. The concern would 
be that units with a floor area just above the cut-offs are reported to have floor area below the 
cut-off for the unit to qualify for a higher HA. Second, if the construction of new units 
responds to this incentive, over time, the whole rental housing stock could start to reflect 
these cut-offs in the system. The rental housing stock could adjust by conversion of owner-
occupied units to rental units and vice versa.  
In addition, it is possible that the cut-offs also lead to sorting by inducing changes in the level 
of the HA and thereby in net rents. Because non-recipients and recipients face different 
incentives, recipients could be expected to be over-represented just below the floor area cut-
offs. 
All these different ways of manipulating the assignment variable should show up as 
discontinuities in the distribution of floor area at the cut-offs. We examine the distribution in 
Figure 4 and in Table 7.  
Figure 4 shows that there are spikes in the distribution at the round values 25, 30 and 35 just 
below the cut-offs, but there is a similar spike at 40 square meters with no floor area cut-off 
(and also at 20 square meters, which is not shown in the figure). The figure also shows that 
integers are in general much more common than half-integers. In general, based on the figure, 
it seems that there are no abnormal jumps in the distribution at the cut-offs.  
Table 7 shows the change in the number of observations (and log of number of observations) 
when crossing the cut-offs when we control for 2nd order polynomials of floor area. A dummy 
for integer values is included as a control (not included in Figure 4), because otherwise the 
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presence of integers just to the right of the cut-offs could bias the test. The table confirms that 
there are no statistically significant jumps in the density of floor area at the cut-offs.   
We then turn to the characteristics of the dwellings and households. Figure 5 and Table 8 
report the balance of covariates tests for some household characteristics (household age, size 
and income). They also show the construction year, share of units located in Helsinki and 
share of private owners at different floor areas. The construction year and Helsinki dummy 
are of particular interest because the rent ceiling depends not only on the floor area but also on 
the construction year and affordability group. 
Figure 5 shows that in general larger units tend to be located in newer buildings and are less 
likely to be located in Helsinki and more likely to have a private owner. Also, households in 
larger units are older, larger and have higher incomes.  
Table 8 shows that the year of construction, dummy for Helsinki and dummy for private 
owner are balanced at the cut-offs but for household characteristics there are statistically 
significant jumps at some of the cut-offs, indicating that there may be sorting based on 
household characteristics into different floor area groups. The fact that the sign of the jumps 
varies between cut-offs, however, suggests that an alternative reason is that the standard 
errors are downward biased for household characteristics because the errors are correlated 
within household and the same households are observed many times. Table A3 in Appendix 
A shows that only one coefficient is significant at the 5% level when we cluster standard 
errors at the household level. Using household level clustering in our main analysis leads to 
lower standard errors, and thus, we hold to the more conservative floor area clustering.   
Table 9 addresses the concern that non-random heaping of the data to integer values of floor 
area might bias our results. We control for integer values through a dummy variable in all 
regressions but this might not be sufficient. As suggested by Barreca et al. (2016), we report 
the IV and reduced form of IV estimates for a sample limited to integers of floor area in Table 
9. The results are very similar to the corresponding specification in Tables 4 and 5. Note that
the standard errors in Table 9 are likely to be downward biased due to the low number of 
clusters (20 instead of 40). 
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The way we have constructed the estimation sample from the original payment level data 
implies that dwellings with more frequent changes in rent, high turnover or tenants with 
frequent changes in HA get higher weight than dwellings where these key variables are more 
stable. In Table A5, we test for the robustness of our IV estimates to drawing a sample which 
includes only one (randomly drawn) observation per year for each dwelling. The sample size 
reduces from 272,941 to 182,217, but the results are very similar to our main IV estimates in 
Table 5.  
Finally, we analyze the robustness of the IV estimates to the functional form of floor area by 
reporting specifications with all the combinations of 1st–3rd order polynomials for the four 
intervals separated by the three floor area cut-offs as a robustness check (81 specifications 
altogether). The findings are reported in Table A6. We do not find positive point estimates in 
any of the specifications. There are some counterintuitive negative and significant estimates 
when we use a 1st order polynomial for the first interval. With intermediate degrees of 
flexibility we find small and insignificant estimates similar to our main specifications. With 
higher order polynomials the point estimates tend to move further away from zero but remain 
statistically insignificant. 
External validity 
Our results suggest that the incidence of differences in HA due to discontinuities in the 
Finnish HA scheme is on the tenant. The results may be generalizable to other settings where 
HA depends on characteristics of the dwelling or characteristics of the household, such as 
household size and income. The findings are not informative as to whether the demand 
increase due to the existence of the HA scheme affects the overall rent level or whether HA 
recipients pay a premium relative to non-recipients. 
5 Conclusions 
We study the effect of housing demand subsidies on rents exploiting the stepwise nature of 
the Finnish HA scheme. During the time period of the study, the HA system featured 
discontinuities in the rent ceiling per square meter as a function of the floor area of the unit. 
These discontinuities are informative of whether the HA affects rents because there is no 
other reason to expect the relationship between rents and unit size to be stepwise. 
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The discontinuities in the amount of HA at the cut-offs studied are economically and 
statistically significant. However, we do not find evidence of discontinuities in rents at these 
cut-offs when focusing on HA recipient households in the private rental housing market. 
Instead, it seems that differences in the size of the housing allowance are translated into 
differences in the out-of-pocket rent of the recipient households.   
More generally, while our results are not informative about the effects of the overall size of 
the housing allowance system, they do suggest that the incidence of small changes in the 
parameters of the system is largely on the tenants.  
Tables 
Table 1. Rent ceilings (euro/m2 per month) as a function of floor area and construction year, 
affordability region 3, year 2012. 
Construction year  
Floor area (m2) –1985 1986–1995 1996–
< 26 11.4 12.68 13.18
26 – 30.9 10.56 11.84 12.34
31 – 35.9 9.72 11 11.5 
36 – 45.9 9.27 10.64 11.15
46 – 60.9 8.96 10.26 10.76
61 – 80.9 8.76 9.82 10.33
> 81 8.68 9.74 10.24
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Table 2. Summary statistics for the main estimation sample (N = 272,941). 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rent ceiling/m2 11.07 1.48 7.73 15.35 
Rent (EUR per month) 433.96 107.22 61.74 1580.00 
Rent/m2 14.07 4.10 2.00 39.74
HA (EUR per month) 225.70 73.11 16.83 481.60 
HA/m2 7.27 2.40 0.42 17.17
Net rent (EUR per month) 208.26 112.52 12.35 1354.40 
Net rent/m2 6.80 3.92 0.40 34.44 
Floor area 31.53 4.87 21.00 40.50 
Floor area>25.9 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Floor area>30.9 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Floor area>35.9 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Construction year 1985.10 21.83 1620.00 2013.00 
Age of recipient 32.98 12.28 16.00 66.00 
Household size 1.04 0.23 1.00 8.00 
Deductible (EUR per month) 46.63 83.19 0.00 468.00 
Hh income excluding HA (EUR per month) 561.03 349.35 0.00 2156.00 
Rent ceiling binding 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 
HA paid to landlord 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Private owner 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Integer floor area 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Affordability region 1 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Affordability region 2 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Affordability region 3 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Table 3. Length of HA spells starting in 2009. 
Length of HA spell Percent Cumulative percentage
1 year 28.19 28.19 
2 years 29.4 57.58 
3 years 12.58 70.17 
4 years 6.81 76.97 
5 or more years 23.03 100 
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Table 4. Discontinuities in monthly HA, rent and net rent (1st stage and reduced form of IV regression). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep var HA/m2 HA/m2 HA/m2 HA/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Net Rent/m2 
Floor area>25.9 -0.786*** -0.527*** -0.497*** -0.576*** -2.232*** 0.263*** -0.134 -0.152 0.363** 
[0.042] [0.033] [0.062] [0.038] [0.390] [0.093] [0.159] [0.167] [0.156] 
Floor area>30.9 -0.662*** -0.409*** -0.455*** -0.575*** -1.331*** 0.118 0.193 0.165 0.648*** 
[0.042] [0.037] [0.066] [0.043] [0.223] [0.073] [0.122] [0.130] [0.079] 
Floor area>35.9 -0.644*** -0.118* -0.224*** -0.245*** -0.853*** 0.127* -0.008 0.024 0.216*** 
[0.104] [0.068] [0.076] [0.042] [0.144] [0.070] [0.084] [0.081] [0.057] 
1st stage F 463.7 96.2 50.4 183.8 
Order of polynomials of floor area No 1st 2nd 2nd No 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Dwelling and area characteristics X X X X X X X X X
Household characteristics X X 
Notes: N=272,941. Table shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut-offs. Dwelling and area characteristics include construction year dummies 
interacted with affordability group, dummy for integer values of floor area interacted with affordability group, municipality-year fixed effects and postcode fixed effects. 
Household characteristics include age of recipient, age squared, household income (pre-allowance), income squared and household size dummies. Standard errors 
clustered at discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5. IV results on the effect of housing allowance on rents. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep var Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Net Rent/m2 
HA/m2 2.043*** -0.395** -0.14 -0.1 -1.140*** 
[0.122] [0.170] [0.178] [0.151] [0.178] 
1st stage F 463.7 96.2 50.4 183.8 50.4 
Order of polynomials of floor area No 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Dwelling and area characteristics X X X X X
Household characteristics X 
Notes: N=272,941. Table shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and net rent/m2. The 
excluded instruments are the three dummies for floor area cut-offs. 1st stage regressions are shown in Table 4. 
Dwelling and area characteristics include construction year dummies interacted with affordability group, 
dummy for integer values of floor area interacted with affordability group, municipality-year fixed effects and 
postcode fixed effects. Household characteristics include age of recipient, age squared, household income 
(pre-allowance), income squared and household size dummies. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of 
floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6. Estimated effect of HA on rent in sub-groups. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sub-sample 
HA paid to 
landlord 
Below mean 
income 
Above mean 
income 
Flat in data in 5 or 
more years 
Recipient in data in 5 or 
more years 
Private 
landlord 
Firm 
landlord 
Dep var Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2
Panel A: IV results 
HA/m2 0.024 -0.096 -0.195 0.27 0.164 -0.057 -0.775
[0.330] [0.121] [0.277] [0.250] [0.270] [0.104] [0.499]
1st stage F 45.2 403.4 44.4 17.6 23.1 82.3 4.7 
N 71514 125758 147183 101484 114173 200709 72232
Panel B: Reduced form of IV 
Floor area>25.9 -0.295 -0.01 -0.268 -0.638** -0.468** 0.031 -0.387
[0.292] [0.135] [0.225] [0.259] [0.207] [0.084] [0.486] 
Floor area>30.9 0.187 0.083 0.278 0.369* 0.316 0.011 0.605***
[0.256] [0.088] [0.171] [0.217] [0.241] [0.086] [0.217] 
Floor area>35.9 0.106 0.037 -0.025 -0.257* -0.218** 0.044 0.072
[0.134] [0.115] [0.078] [0.138] [0.098] [0.087] [0.141] 
N 71514 125758 147183 101484 114173 200709 72232
Order of polynomials of 
floor area 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd
Dwelling and area 
characteristics X X X X X X X
Notes: Panel A shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and net rent/m2. The excluded instruments are the three dummies for floor area cut-offs.  
Panel B shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut-offs from a regression of Rent/m2 on floor area group dummies and controls. Dwelling and area 
characteristics include construction year dummies interacted with affordability group, dummy for integer values of floor area interacted with affordability group, 
municipality-year fixed effects and postcode fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 7. Tests for discontinuities in the density of floor area. 
(1) (2) 
Dep var Number of observations Ln(Number of observations) 
Floor area>25.9 -388.017 0.132 
[1492.702] [0.294]
Floor area>30.9 -2485.19 -0.202 
[5996.131] [0.348]
Floor area>35.9 -520.999 -0.178 
[1187.473] [0.158] 
N 40 40
Order of polynomial of floor area 2nd 2nd 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut-offs. Dummy for integer values of 
floor area included as a control. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in brackets * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
Table 8. Balance of covariates tests. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep var 
Year of 
construction Helsinki 
Private 
owner Age hh size hh income
Floor area>25.9 0.377 0.052 -0.002 -0.293 0.009*** 14.5 
[2.821] [0.103] [0.039] [0.619] [0.003] [11.503] 
Floor area>30.9 1.039 0.000 0.069 -2.270*** 0.005 -17.281** 
[1.393] [0.035] [0.046] [0.510] [0.003] [6.866] 
Floor area>35.9 0.235 -0.029 0.029 0.409 -0.012** 0.205 
[1.829] [0.024] [0.034] [0.534] [0.006] [5.008] 
Order of polynomial  
of floor area 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Notes: N=272,941. Table shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut-offs. Standard errors 
clustered at discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 9. Integers only sample. 
(1) 
Integer values of floor area only 
Dep var Rent/m2 
Panel A: IV results 
HA/m2 -0.063
[0.080] 
1st stage F 130.5 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV 
Floor area>25.9 -0.009 
[0.115] 
Floor area>30.9 0.031 
[0.050] 
Floor area>35.9 0.088 
[0.083] 
Order of polynomials of floor area 2nd 
Dwelling characteristics X 
Notes: N=204,432. Panel A shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and 
net rent/m2. The excluded instruments are the three dummies for floor area cut-offs.  Panel B 
shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut-offs from a regression of Rent/m2 
on floor area group dummies and controls. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of floor 
area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Floor area, monthly HA per square meter (panel A) and monthly rent per square 
meter (panel B). 
Figure 2. Floor area and monthly rent ceiling. 
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Figure 3. Actual rents relative to the rent ceiling.  
Figure 4. Distribution of floor area of HA recipient households. 
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Figure 5. Discontinuities in dwelling and household characteristics. 
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Appendix A: Additional figures and tables 
Figure A1. Construction year and rent ceiling. 
Figure A2. Construction year and HA per square meter. 
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Figure A3. Construction year and rent per square meter 
Figure A4. Distribution of construction year. 
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Table A1. Discontinuities in HA, rent and net rent (1st stage and reduced form of IV regression, construction year cut-offs). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep var HA/m2 HA/m2 HA/m2 HA/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Net Rent/m2 
Construction or renovation year>1986 0.652*** 0.770*** 0.799*** 0.731*** 0.161 0.464*** -0.143 -0.089 -0.942*** 
[0.045] [0.067] [0.081] [0.042] [0.104] [0.159] [0.177] [0.177] [0.179] 
Construction or renovation year>1996 0.281*** 0.247*** 0.152** 0.409*** 0.218** 0.204** 0.373** 0.332** 0.221 
[0.032] [0.049] [0.072] [0.039] [0.086] [0.084] [0.146] [0.144] [0.144] 
1st stage F 242.6 68.5 52.5 307.3 
Order of polynomials of floor area No 1st 2nd 2nd No 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Dwelling and area characteristics X X X X X X X X X
Household characteristics X X 
Notes: N=132,086. Table shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut-offs. Dwelling and area characteristics include floor area dummies interacted with 
affordability group, municipality-year fixed effects and postcode fixed effects. Household characteristics include age of recipient, age squared, household income (pre-
allowance), income squared and household size dummies. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of construction year are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A2. IV results on the effect of housing allowance on rents (construction year cut-offs). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep var Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Net Rent/m2 
HA/m2 0.415*** 0.618*** 0.071 0.229 -0.929*** 
[0.095] [0.213] [0.221] [0.173] [0.221] 
1st stage F 242.6 68.5 52.5 307.3 52.5 
Order of polynomials of floor area No 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Dwelling and area characteristics X X X X X
Household characteristics X 
Notes: N=132,086. Table shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and net rent/m2. The 
excluded instruments are the two dummies for construction year cut-offs. 1st stage regressions are shown in 
Table 3. Dwelling and area characteristics include floor area dummies interacted with affordability group, 
municipality-year fixed effects and postcode fixed effects. Household characteristics include age of recipient, 
age squared, household income (pre-allowance), income squared and household size dummies. Standard 
errors clustered at discrete values of construction year are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table A3. Balance of covariates tests, clustering at household level. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dep var Age hh size hh income 
Floor area>25.9 -0.293 0.009 14.5 
[0.619] [0.006] [13.764] 
Floor area>30.9 -2.270*** 0.005 -17.281* 
[0.447] [0.005] [9.372] 
Floor area>35.9 0.409 -0.012* 0.205 
[0.484] [0.007] [10.938] 
Order of polynomial of floor area 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Notes: N=272,941. Table shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut-offs.  
Standard errors clustered at household level are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A4. Estimated effect of HA on rent in the social housing sector. 
(1) (2) 
Municipalities Non-profit organisations 
Dep var Rent/m2 Rent/m2 
Panel A: IV results 
HA/m2 0.581 0.445*
[0.516] [0.258]
1st stage F 2.6 9.2 
N 93369 65110
Panel B: Reduced form of IV 
Floor area>25.9 0.128 0.854 
[0.437] [0.599] 
Floor area>30.9 -0.165 0.550*  
[0.193] [0.305] 
Floor area>35.9 -0.012 -0.450*** 
[0.057] [0.175] 
Order of polynomials of floor area 2nd 2nd 
Dwelling and area characteristics X X
Notes: Panel A shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and net rent/m2. The excluded 
instruments are the three dummies for floor area cut-offs.  Panel B shows coefficients on the dummies for 
crossing floor area cut-offs from a regression of Rent/m2 on floor area group dummies and controls. Standard 
errors clustered at discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table A5. Robustness of IV estimates to alternative sample construction (one observation per 
dwelling per year) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep var Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Rent/m2 Net Rent/m2 
HA/m2 2.022*** -0.439*** -0.195 -0.156 -1.195***
[0.120] [0.165] [0.161] [0.138] [0.161] 
1st stage F 2047.2 62.7 37.7 203.8 37.7 
N 182217 182217 182217 182217 182217
Order of polynomials of floor area No 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Dwelling characteristics X X X X X
Household characteristics X 
Notes: N=182,217. Table shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and net rent/m2. 
Sample includes only one randomly drawn observation per dwelling per year. The excluded instruments are 
the three dummies for floor area cut-offs. 1st stage regressions are shown in Table 3. Household 
characteristics include age of recipient, age squared, household income (pre-allowance), income squared and 
household size dummies. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A6. Robustness of IV estimates to functional form. (Model title indicates the order of 
polynomial used for each interval around the cut-offs.) 
IV1111 IV1112 IV1113 IV1121 IV1122 IV1123 IV1131 IV1132 IV1133    
-0.395** -0.414** -0.412** -0.463*** -0.450*** -0.434*** -0.464*** -0.428*** -0.462***
[0.170] [0.168] [0.163] [0.140] [0.136] [0.133] [0.138] [0.136] [0.136]    
IV1211 IV1212 IV1213 IV1221 IV1222 IV1223 IV1231 IV1232 IV1233    
-0.379** -0.372** -0.369** -0.458*** -0.442*** -0.427*** -0.455*** -0.420*** -0.453***
[0.172] [0.172] [0.168] [0.155] [0.150] [0.147] [0.152] [0.147] [0.147]    
IV1311 IV1312 IV1313 IV1321 IV1322 IV1323 IV1331 IV1332 IV1333    
-0.390** -0.405*** -0.393*** -0.468*** -0.470*** -0.535*** -0.549*** -0.475*** -0.524***
[0.163] [0.151] [0.149] [0.154] [0.163] [0.161] [0.172] [0.174] [0.174]    
IV2111 IV2112 IV2113 IV2121 IV2122 IV2123 IV2131 IV2132 IV2133 
-0.242 -0.225 -0.223 -0.285 -0.269 -0.255 -0.283 -0.252 -0.283 
[0.170] [0.164] [0.162] [0.186] [0.177] [0.174] [0.179] [0.174] [0.174] 
IV2211 IV2212 IV2213 IV2221 IV2222 IV2223 IV2231 IV2232 IV2233 
-0.08 -0.091 -0.09 -0.156 -0.14 -0.129 -0.149 -0.108 -0.124 
[0.157] [0.156] [0.154] [0.188] [0.178] [0.172] [0.184] [0.176] [0.183] 
IV2311 IV2312 IV2313 IV2321 IV2322 IV2323 IV2331 IV2332 IV2333 
-0.12 -0.124 -0.118 -0.15 -0.088 -0.089 -0.085 -0.029 -0.044 
[0.169] [0.167] [0.162] [0.189] [0.237] [0.261] [0.285] [0.249] [0.270] 
IV3111 IV3112 IV3113 IV3121 IV3122 IV3123 IV3131 IV3132 IV3133 
-0.146 -0.155 -0.146 -0.218 -0.233 -0.213 -0.207 -0.167 -0.184 
[0.190] [0.193] [0.187] [0.165] [0.165] [0.158] [0.168] [0.162] [0.167] 
IV3211 IV3212 IV3213 IV3221 IV3222 IV3223 IV3231 IV3232 IV3233 
-0.114 -0.114 -0.109 -0.163 -0.264 -0.373 -0.521 -0.357 -0.441 
[0.168] [0.165] [0.161] [0.195] [0.278] [0.330] [0.394] [0.340] [0.388] 
IV3311 IV3312 IV3313 IV3321 IV3322 IV3323 IV3331 IV3332 IV3333 
-0.264 -0.309 -0.291 -0.398 -0.377 -0.476 -0.498 -0.345 -0.441 
[0.220] [0.211] [0.198] [0.301] [0.300] [0.357] [0.483] [0.320] [0.399] 
Notes: N=272,941. Table shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on Rent/m2. Model titles 
indicate the polynomials used for each interval of floor area separated by the cut-offs. For example 
IV2222 means that we use a second order polynomial for all four intervals. Controls include dwelling and 
area characteristics: construction year dummies interacted with affordability group, dummy for integer 
values of floor area interacted with affordability group, municipality-year fixed effects and postcode fixed 
effects. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 
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Appendix B: Robustness analysis of Kangasharju (2010)  
In this appendix, we study the robustness of the findings of Kangasharju (2010) (henceforth 
K2010) by analyzing the 2002 reform using the same data. The program code used in K2010 
was not available to us but we follow the methodology as reported in the paper. We focus on 
Tables 8 and 9 of the original paper presenting the key differences-in-differences and 
instrumental variables result.  
We end up with a substantially larger estimation sample than K2010. Thus, using the 
terminology suggested by Clemens (2017) our analysis is perhaps better interpreted as a 
robustness check by reanalyzing the data than as a replication. The reason for the difference in 
sample size is not known to us but probably reflects differences in choices made when 
constructing the estimation sample (not all choices are reported in K2010).  
The 2002 reform 
The reform divided the HMA into two regions: the city of Helsinki (affordability region 1) 
and the rest of the metropolitan area (affordability region 2). In addition, the reform reduced 
the number of construction year cut-offs from three to two and divided the first floor area 
group (flats smaller than 36m2) into three different groups (smaller than 25.9m2, 26–30.9m2 
and 31–35.9m2). But most importantly for the identification of the effects of HA on rents, the 
reform increased the rent ceilings with varying degrees for all HA recipients. The increases 
were largest for small flats in the city of Helsinki. For instance, for a 25m2 flat located in 
Helsinki and built before 1985, the rent ceiling increased from 7.74 euros to 11.25 euros per 
square meter.   
Data 
We use the Income Distribution Statistics data from Statistics Finland for the years 2000–
2003. The data contain roughly 10,000 households and 28,000 individuals each year and 
combines register data with a survey. Each household is present in the data for two 
consecutive years. Information on rents is based on the housing allowance register and the 
survey. 
The data include information on the number of months HA was received, the total annual 
amount of HA and the amount of HA received in December by each member of the 
household. We collapse the data to the household level and sum up the HA variables within 
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the household. We define HA recipients as households that, according to the IDS records, 
have received HA within the survey year and have at least one HA month. We drop 
households with negative HA (due to claw back of excessive HA paid previously), 
households with positive HA but zero HA months, and households with zero HA but positive 
HA months. In addition we drop out households with zero or missing rent.  
Methods 
The main method of K2010 is an instrumental variables regression of rent/m2 on HA/m2 
where the change in the rent ceiling due to the reform of 2002 is used as an instrument for 
housing allowance. Before the instrumental variables estimation he runs a differences-in-
differences (DiD) regression of ln(rent/m2) on a dummy for HA recipient status (Allowance), 
dummy for years 2002 and 2003 after the reform (After), interaction term (Allowance*After) 
and a set of control variables (see K2010, Table A1) interacted with dummies for Helsinki 
and the rest of the HMA. He runs the DiD regression separately for the private rental market 
and social housing units owned by municipalities, and for two time windows around the 
reform (2001–2002 and 2000–2003). In addition, he reports two placebo tests using a two-
year period before the reform (2000–2001) and after the reform (2002–2003). He finds a 
weakly significant positive effect on rents for the two-year window (2001–2002) and a 
significant positive effect for the wider time window (2000–2003) in the private rental 
markets but no impact in the placebo tests or in the municipal social housing sector. 
Table B1 shows our results from a similar DiD analysis. Our estimation sample (N=3641) is 
larger than in K2010 (N=2660).21 For the private rental market in the upper panel, we find 
smaller DiD coefficients than K2010. With the 2–year window (2001–2002) our point 
estimate is 0.03 and insignificant (compared with 0.048 with t-value 1.7 in K2010) and with 
the 4–year window our point estimate is 0.035 and significant at the 10% level (K2010’s 
estimate is 0.051 with t-value 2.4). The placebo estimates are similar to K2010.  
Turning to the municipal housing sector in the lower panel, we find positive and significant 
DiD estimates. The results are unexpected since in the municipal rental sector rents should be 
based on maintenance and capital costs and should not be affected by the amount of HA. 
They are also in contrast with K2010’s finding of small and insignificant coefficients. On the 
21 Apparently, there is an error in the ‘free markets’ 2000–2001 sample size (Column (a) of Table 8 in K2010), 
because the 2000–2001 and 2002–2003 sample sizes should sum up to the ‘All’ sample size. 
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other hand, as Table B3 below indicates, the changes in the rent ceilings caused by the reform 
are not correlated with the HA variable. This would suggest that the differences in changes in 
the rental rates of recipient and non-recipient households in the municipal rental sector are not 
driven by the reform.  
Table B1. Reanalysis of the 2002 reform – DiD estimates (cf. K2010 Table 8) 
Placebo 2-year window Placebo 4-year window 
Period 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2000–03 
Free markets 
Allowance*After 0.016 0.03 -0.024 0.035*
[0.031] [0.033] [0.028] [0.021] 
R2 0.63 0.613 0.622 0.615
Sample size 1769 1786 1872 3641 
Number of assisted households 408 323 345 753 
Municipal sector 
Allowance*After -0.03 0.055** -0.011 0.036**
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.017] 
R2 0.463 0.509 0.491 0.454 
Sample size 1154 1152 1216 2370 
Number of assisted households 392 375 401 793 
Notes: Table shows DiD estimates of the HA reform of 2002. All specifications include control variables listed in 
Kangasharju (2010). Robust standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table B2 reports the IV estimates for the effect of HA on rent. For the ‘Assisted only’ sample 
HA/m2 is instrumented with After*Change, where Change is the change in the rent ceiling in 
the 2002 reform for the type of flat inhabited by the household. The main effects of After and 
Change are included in the controls along with the same controls as in the DiD estimation of 
Table B1. For the ‘All’ sample including both HA recipients and non-recipients, the excluded 
instrument is Allowance*After*Change. The main effects and pairwise interactions of 
Allowance, After and Change are controlled for. 
The two first columns of Table B2 show the results for the free market sector (logarithmic 
model in the upper panel and linear model in the lower panel). K2010 reported elasticities of 
0.24 (for assisted only) and 0.31 (for all households) and euro-on-euro effects of roughly 0.7. 
Starting from the ‘assisted only’ sample in the first column of Table B2, our IV estimates are 
smaller than in K2010 and statistically insignificant. Turning to the ‘All’ sample in column 2, 
a notable difference between our analysis and K2010 is that we find low first stage F values 
indicating severe weak instrument problems, whereas he reported very strong first stage F 
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values for the ‘All’ sample. The 3rd and 4th column show the results for the municipal social 
housing sector. Similarly to K2010, the first stage F-statistics are too low for meaningful IV 
estimation. Table B3 reports the first stage results for all IV specifications. 
Table B2. Reanalysis of the 2002 reform – IV estimates (cf. K2010 Table 9) 
Dep. var. Ln(rent/m2) 
Free markets Municipal sector 
Assisted only All Assisted only All 
ln(HA/m2) 0.100 0.463 -1.979 0.017
[0.096] [0.324] [4.696] [0.020]
Sample size 753 3641 793 2370 
First stage F (Kleibergen-Paap) 12.89 3.293 0.167 0.258 
Dep. var. rent/m2 
Free markets Municipal sector 
Assisted only All Assisted only All 
HA/m2 0.321 1.25 3.76 -0.013
[0.212] [1.511] [9.282] [0.065]
Sample size 753 3641 793 2370 
First stage F (Kleibergen-Paap) 8.344 0.949 0.14 0.044 
Notes: Table shows IV estimates of the effect of HA on rents. The excluded instrument is After*Change (or 
After*Ln(Change) for the ‘Assisted only’ sample, and Allowance*After*Change (or 
Allowance*After*Ln(Change)) for the ‘All’ sample. All specifications include control variables listed in 
Kangasharju (2010), and main effects and pairwise interactions of After, Allowance and Change. First stage 
estimates are shown in Table B3. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B3. Reanalysis of the 2002 reform – first stage of IV estimates (cf. K2010 Table A3) 
Dep. var. Ln(HA/m2) 
Free markets Municipal sector 
Assisted only All Assisted only All 
ln(Change)*After 2.336*** -0.25
[0.651] [0.605]
ln(Change)*After*Allowance 1.170* -0.296
[0.645] [0.583]
Sample size 753 3641 793 2370 
First stage F (Kleibergen-Paap) 12.89 3.293 0.167 0.258 
Dep. var. HA/m2 
Free markets Municipal sector 
Assisted only All Assisted only All 
Change*After 1.559*** 0.13
[0.539] [0.353]
Change*After*Allowance 0.435 -0.062
[0.446] [0.296]
Sample size 753 3641 793 2370 
First stage F (Kleibergen-Paap) 8.344 0.949 0.14 0.044 
Notes: Table shows the first stage of the IV estimates reported in Table B2. Robust standard errors are in 
brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The conclusion is that the results indicating large effects of HA on rents found in K2010 are 
not robust to reanalysis of the same data following the methods as reported in the paper. The 
results of our reanalysis are consistent with the other findings of this paper suggesting that the 
incidence of differences in HA for different types of dwellings is on the tenant. 
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